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This factsheet gives answers on how climate exacerbates root causes of conflict in Nigeria, using an 
impact pathway analysis. Three main impact pathways are identified: 
1. Resource availability and access pathway: Due to impact of drought and desertification on pastoral 
resources in northern arid and semi-arid parts of Nigeria, herders are pushed southwards, moving 
beyond their usual grazing routes and seasons, resulting in competition and conflict with farmers over 
access and use of arable lands and water resources; 
2. Livelihood and food insecurity pathway: Vulnerability of Nigeria’s Lake Chad region to climate 
variability could be understood as compounded by grievances related to severe livelihood, food and 
water insecurities, growing inequality, poor socioeconomic conditions, and political marginalization, 
reinforcing a feedback loop of “climate-conflict trap”; 
3. Fossil fuels, environmental impacts, and livelihood insecurity pathway: Overall risks of insecurity and 
violence over oil in the Niger delta can be attributed to complex interactions between ecological, social 
and institutional factors, compounded by weak governance, poor implementation of environmental 
protection regulations, as well as exclusion of local communities from resource rents and benefits.
Tanaya Dutta Gupta, Ignacio Madurga-Lopez, Peter Läderach and Grazia Pacillo 
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This publication is part of a factsheet series reporting on the findings of the CGIAR FOCUS Climate 
Security Observatory work in Africa (Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe). 
The research is centered around 5 questions*:  
How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict? 
Impact pathways 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Econometric analysis 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Scopus analysis** 
Where are the climate insecurities hotspots? 
Spatial analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, 
and socio-economic system? 
Network analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Are climate and security policies coherent and integrated? 
Policy coherence analysis
Are policy makers aware of the climate security nexus?
Social media analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Click on the links above to view the other Factsheets 
* Questions 1, 2, 3, 5 are analyzed at country level through a Climate Risk Lens (impact pathways, economic, spatial, network and social 
media analyses). The policy coherence and scopus analyses are at continental level.
**Scopus is one of the largest curated abstract and citation databases, with a wide global and regional coverage of scientific journals, 
conference proceedings, and books. We used Scopus data for analyzing: (1) how global climate research addresses the dynamics 
between climate, socio-economic factors, and conflict, and (2) how the countries studied are represented in the database. 
© 2021 CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. 
This is an open-access document distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
are credited. 
The views expressed in this document cannot be taken to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agen-
cies. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report do not imply the expression of any 
opinion on the part of CGIAR concerning the legal status of any country, territory, area, city or area or of its authorities, 
or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this document cannot be taken 
to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agencies.
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PATHWAY#1:  
Resource availability and access pathway
Due to impact of drought and desertification on pastoral resources in the northern arid and 
semi-arid parts of Nigeria, ethnic Fulani herders are pushed towards southern parts of the 
country, moving beyond their usual grazing routes and seasons, and even relocating for longer 
periods of time. Simultaneously farmers are trying to bring more land under cultivation in 
response to weather related shocks, resulting in land use changes and pressure on land. Such 
spatial and temporal collision of adaptation efforts may bring “desperate guests” (herders) and 
“unwilling hosts” (farmers) in confrontation with each other, resulting in competition over access 
and use of arable lands and water resources. Triggering effects of losses like destruction of crops 
by cattle for farmers or cattle raids for herders can create tensions between the communities, 
amplifying risks of conflict.
PATHWAY#2:  
Livelihood and food insecurity pathway 
Vulnerability of Nigeria’s Lake Chad region to climate variability could be understood as 
compounded by grievances related to severe food and water insecurity, growing inequality, 
poor socioeconomic conditions, and political marginalization, reinforcing a feedback loop of 
“climate-conflict trap”. Climate impacts, mainly in the forms of droughts and rainfall variability, 
affect availability and distribution of water and land resources, specifically through vegetation 
loss, reduction in arable land, depletion of grazing land and fish stocks. The complex interactions 
of climate with land, water, and food systems can then seriously undermine the viability of 
traditional livelihoods practiced by farmers, herders, and fishers in the area. Moreover, combined 
effects of climate variability and resource conflict may make these livelihoods differentially 
vulnerable. Large-scale internal population movements due to climate and conflict-related 
impacts on rural livelihoods have put serious pressure on urban infrastructure, leading to 
growth of slums and squatter settlements, that can then be linked with human insecurity risks 
such as food insecurity, as well as communal tensions, crime and violence.
PATHWAY#3:  
Fossil fuels, environmental impacts, and livelihood insecurity pathway 
Impact of climate variability on oil industry can worsen already existing conditions of poverty, 
inequality, political marginalization, and lack of trust for the government. Thousands of oil spill 
incidents have been reported over the last several decades, resulting in the spilling of millions 
of oil barrels into the environment. Oil spills in the Niger delta have not only degraded the 
environment and water quality, but also disrupted livelihood structures of local communities 
in the region. The associated loss of livelihoods can amplify human security risks through 
consequences like food insecurity, hunger and poverty, and create grievances and conflict. 
Overall risks of insecurity and violence over oil in the Niger delta can be attributed to complex 
interactions between ecological, social and institutional factors, compounded by weak 
governance, poor implementation of environmental protection regulations, as well as exclusion 
of local communities from resource rents and benefits.
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1. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA) aims to identify, describe, and represent the complex and non-
linear interactions between climate, conflict, and existing vulnerabilities and risks with a special focus 
on food, land, and water systems. In particular, the IPA intends to address the following questions: 
• What are the potential climate security pathways through which climate may act as a threat 
multiplier? 
• Which specific vulnerabilities and risks, that are at the heart of insecurity and conflict, may be 
exacerbated by the climate crisis? 
• How can dimensions such as natural resources, livelihoods, mobility, governance and food, land, and 
water systems, inform climate security pathways in specific contexts?
2. METHODS AND DATA 
The IPA follows a systematic literature search and review to find, collate, analyze and synthesize insights 
from relevant knowledge products, including reports, policy briefs, fact sheets from grey literature, 
as well as books, journal articles, and other sources of documented evidence in academic literature 
and public media. The construction of a narrative is then followed by consultation with a designated 
set of experts and stakeholders through interviews and written feedback to gather evaluation and 
incorporate suggested revisions. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Climate exposure and vulnerability
As a country comprising multiple ecological regions, and facing medium exposure to ecological 
threats (Institute for Economics & Peace 2020), Nigeria experiences high vulnerability in food and 
water sectors (University of Notre Dame 2019), especially from increasing temperatures and rainfall 
variability, along with risks from more severe weather events and sea level rise. Multiple pathways 
could be identified linking climate impacts to security risks. With parts of the arid northern Sahel area 
experiencing more heat and less rain, many parts of the country facing more severe weather with 
torrential rains, along with a nearly one-foot rise in sea level observed over the last half century over the 
southern coastline (Federal Ministry of Environment 2009), Nigeria could be facing serious resource 
shortages, compounded by problems like environmental degradation and inefficient resource 
management (Sayne 2011). Land scarcity could be connected with the process of desertification in the 
north, intensifying drought conditions, with adverse impact on agriculture and livelihood resulting 
in acute food and water scarcity. Water scarcity is exacerbated by poor water management, use and 
conservation practices (FAO 2009). This scenario stands in contrast to parts of southern Nigeria, where 
flooding due to sea level rise is leading to conditions of high salinity and water pollution with saltwater 
contamination of freshwater aquifers (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2003). Overall, vulnerability 
analysis has illuminated that “states in the north experience higher degrees of vulnerability to climate 
change than those in the south” (Madu 2016; Federal Ministry of Environment 2014; Haider 2019). 
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3.2 Socio-economic and political insecurity 
As a country heavily dependent on oil revenues, Nigeria’s economy has been hit by COVID-induced 
shocks, specifically disruptions due to oil price declines. With a major section of its population 
living below the poverty line, Nigeria continues to face serious developmental challenges, owing to 
inflation, unemployment, regional inequality, inadequate infrastructure, and weak governance (World 
Bank 2021). Along with climate variability and socio-economic vulnerability, Nigeria’s population has 
historically experienced violence involving multiple actors, including tensions between ethnic and 
religious groups, armed insurgency, and government repression (Dorff et al. 2020). The landscape of 
conflict risks in Nigeria today can be prominently characterized not only by the violent actions of Boko 
Haram, but also by engagement of other actors like local militant groups and security forces.
3.3 Climate security pathways 
Following are the potential key pathways through which climate related fragility can inform risks of 
conflict and violence (Figure 1). 
PATHWAY #1: Resource availability and access pathway
Due to impact of drought and desertification on pastoral resources in the northern arid and semi-
arid parts of Nigeria, ethnic Fulani herders are pushed towards southern parts of the country, moving 
beyond their usual grazing routes and seasons, and even relocating for longer periods of time (Fasona 
and Omojola 2005; Azuwike and Enwerem 2010). Simultaneously farmers are trying to bring more land 
under cultivation in response to weather related shocks, resulting in land use changes and pressure 
on land. Such spatial and temporal collision of adaptation efforts may bring “desperate guests” 
(herders) and “unwilling hosts” (farmers) in confrontation with each other, resulting in competition 
over access and use of arable lands and water resources (Olaniyan and Okeke-Uzodike 2015; Akinyemi 
and Olaniyan 2017). Triggering effects of losses like destruction of crops by cattle for farmers or cattle 
raids for herders can create tensions between the communities, amplifying risks of conflict (Sayne 
2011; Akinyemi and Olaniyan 2017). Though climate impact may lead to changes in pastoral mobility 
patterns and indirectly influence farmer-herder conflicts, it may not necessarily act as a direct 
predictor of ensuing violence (Madu and Nwankwo 2020). However, the role of desertification as a 
key contextual factor influencing farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria is being increasingly recognized, 
alongside political and economic drivers (Lenshie et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, together with socio-political and institutional factors, climate may act as a magnifier for 
conflict risks between the farmers and herders. Recent incidences of violence between farmers and 
herders have reportedly led to more fatalities than the Boko Haram insurgency. This is exemplified 
by the situation in Benue and Nasarawa states, with Benue passing an anti-grazing law restricting 
entry of migrating herders in farmlands, thereby driving thousands of Fulani pastoralists to relocate in 
neighboring Nasarawa. This ignited longstanding tensions between Fulani herders and the ethnic Tiv 
farming community, resulting in intercommunal violence in 2018, and necessitating state authorities 
to exercise legitimate use of violence (Eberle et al. 2020). Such instances have paved way for the 
National Livestock Transformation Plan in 2019, with the aim to curtail free-roaming herding practices 
and open grazing, by concentrating grazing activities to ranches and reserves in states like Nasarawa 
(International Crisis Group 2021; Eberle et al. 2020). 
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Figure 1: Climate Security Pathways for Nigeria.
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PATHWAY #2: Livelihood and food insecurity pathway
Shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the marginalized and volatile Lake Chad region presents 
a stage for multiple interrelated climate fragility risks (Nagarajan et al. 2018). Resources around the 
Lake Chad basin supports livelihoods of more than 45 million people, with Nigerians forming the 
largest population in the basin (Kombe et al. 2016). Observed and projected decrease in discharge 
of the Chari River basin, the main feeder for Lake Chad, can be mainly attributed to climatic factors 
and human activities (Mahmood et al. 2020). Temperature is predicted to increase, and precipitation 
is predicted to decrease over the next two decades (Mahmood et al. 2019) in this transboundary 
basin experiencing ongoing conflict dynamics. Vulnerability of Nigeria’s Lake Chad region to climate 
variability could therefore be understood as compounded by grievances related to severe food and 
water insecurity, growing inequality, poor socioeconomic conditions, and political marginalization, 
reinforcing a feedback loop of “climate-conflict trap” (Vivekananda et al. 2019; Schaller et al. 2020). 
Though water-related stress and uncertainty in this region have received significant attention, the 
complex loop has arguably remained relatively underexplored (Nagabhatla et al. 2020). 
PATHWAY #2.1 Agro-pastoral and fishery losses
Livelihood insecurity forms the key pathway through which this feedback loop operates. The northern 
states of Nigeria belting the Lake Chad Basin face serious risks of desertification and associated 
environmental problems (e.g., water pollution from tanneries and textile factories in Kano). Both 
agriculture and livestock-based livelihoods in this region have considerable water requirements, 
which explains the presence of multiple dams and irrigation projects on the Nigerian part of the basin, 
a factor that has likely contributed to depletion of fish species in the Komadugu-Yobe River (Kombe et 
al. 2016). Climate impacts, mainly in the forms of droughts and rainfall variability, affect availability and 
distribution of water and land resources, specifically through vegetation loss, reduction in arable land, 
depletion of grazing land and fish stocks. The complex interactions of climate with land, water, and 
food systems can then seriously undermine the viability of traditional livelihoods practiced by farmers, 
herders, and fishers in the area (Onuoha 2010). Moreover, combined effects of climate variability and 
resource conflict may make these livelihoods differentially vulnerable (Okpara et al. 2017).
Lack of sustainable alternatives can push people towards activities like deforestation and shifting 
cultivation, resulting in further environmental degradation and biodiversity loss in this fragile 
ecosystem (Kombe et al. 2016). Left without sustainable livelihood options and support, a situation 
worsened by weak governance, unequal development outcomes, lack of public goods and services, 
political marginalization of the region, and conflict between state and non-state actors, often resulting 
in inhibited access to the basin’s resources, people desperate for survival are likely to be recruited 
by armed insurgent groups such as Boko Haram (Nett and Rüttinger 2016). Furthermore, livelihood 
related stresses can have deteriorating effects on social cohesion between groups, within groups and 
even within families, fueling tensions, sexual and gender-based violence, and criminality (Owonikoko 
and Momodu 2020).
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PATHWAY #2.2 Rural-Urban migration
Resultant insecurity risks around access to food, water, and income, amplified by the Boko Haram 
insurgency, can force people to migrate from affected rural areas to urban centers. For instance, 
Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state has received vast numbers of internally displaced people from 
rural areas, many of them finding shelter in IDP camps (Kamta et al. 2020; Kamta and Scheffran 2021). 
Overall, armed violence in the region, mainly fueled by Boko Haram’s activities, has been identified 
as a prominent cause of displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from Borno, Yobe and 
Adamawa states. Together with livelihood erosion, these act as major drivers of out-migration from 
areas surrounding the Lake Chad basin. Some of the mobility dynamics from this region involve 
changing characteristics of pastoral migration, which as described above, can be linked with risks of 
farmer-herder conflicts. What is perhaps more relevant here is internal migration from rural to urban 
areas, as a result of climate and conflict-related combined impacts on rural livelihoods. Large-scale 
internal population movements have put serious pressure on urban infrastructure, leading to growth 
of slums and squatter settlements, that can then be linked with human insecurity risks such as food 
insecurity, as well as communal tensions, crime and violence (Fasona and Omojola 2005; Owonikoko 
and Momodu 2020). Persistent inequalities and fractionalization between a Muslim majority north 
and a predominantly Christian south, with overlaps between regional and ethnic group identities 
(Mancini 2009), can further fuel these risks.
PATHWAY #2.3 Weak governance
The presence of state security forces and local vigilante groups through the formation of Civilian Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) can affect the state’s capacity to respond effectively by addressing underlying 
vulnerabilities driving non-traditional security risks (Okpara et al. 2015; Angerbrandt 2017, Vivekananda 
2018, Day and Caus 2020). Lack of formalization and proper implementation of environmental codes 
by the Nigerian government can further contribute to reinforcing this vicious cycle of fragility and 
violence (Kombe et al. 2016). Beyond conventional assumptions around insurgency in the north-east 
driven by grievances against the government, the role of factionalized political elites in this partial 
democracy, lending political relevance to a group like Boko Haram (Iyekekpolo 2020), could be 
considered for a deeper understanding of complexities underpinning climate-conflict linkages in this 
region.
Regional diplomacy can be key for effective resource governance in a fragile setting such as the Lake 
Chad basin, with potential dividends for long-term peace and stability. In 2018, the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) adopted the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (RSS) 
of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Basin Region, which for Nigeria include the states of 
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Endorsed by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, 
the RSS focuses on nine strategic pillars of intervention, including areas of cross-border cooperation, 
human rights and security, humanitarian assistance, livelihood recovery and governance capacity 
among others (LCBC and AU 2018). Gaps related to funding, coordination between stakeholders, as 
well as longer-term implementation of the strategy would need to be adequately addressed to meet 
aims like replacing humanitarian assistance with sustainable livelihood support through climate-
resilient development efforts and investments (Planetary Security Initiative 2021).
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PATHWAY #3: Fossil fuels, environmental impacts, and livelihood insecurity pathway
Another potential pathway would be the oil and environment related crisis in the Niger delta, as the 
oil industry is vulnerable to extreme weather events like storm surges. Impact of climate variability on 
oil industry can worsen already existing conditions of poverty, inequality, political marginalization, and 
lack of trust for the government. As Nigeria is one of the largest oil exporters in the world (Workman 
2016), and the federal government is dependent on oil revenues, there is presumed to be a marriage 
of interest between the Nigerian government and oil companies. Thousands of oil spill incidents have 
been reported over the last several decades, resulting in the spilling of millions of oil barrels into the 
environment (Department of Petroleum Resources 1997; Inoni et al. 2006). Oil spills in the Niger delta 
have not only degraded the environment and water quality, but also disrupted livelihood structures of 
local communities in the region (Pegg and Zabbey 2013; Oshienemen et al. 2018). 
Oils spills have been reported to adversely affect the local economy, through decline in productivity 
of crops such as cassava and yam, and reduced availability of fish species. For example, the Ibani 
community of Bonny River in the Niger delta were among those dependent on fish and salt for 
internal trading in exchange for crops. With the discovery of oil, new infrastructure was built, but 
the development outcomes had detrimental effects on the environment, livelihoods and culture 
of fishing villages. Not only did spillage from oil industry reduce the stock of fish, as well as esem 
(periwinkles) and mgbe (mangrove oysters), it also resulted in pollution of rivers and waterways, causing 
irreversible harm to a fishing economy based on communal ownership of resources (Fentiman 1996). 
Environmental degradation, mainly water pollution and land degradation from oil extraction, also 
impacted farmers through lower agricultural income generation (Apata 2010). The associated loss of 
livelihoods can amplify human security risks through consequences like food insecurity, hunger and 
poverty (IPCC 2007; Elum et al. 2016). 
Lack of sustainable alternatives and livelihood support have then pushed people to migrate to other 
areas in search of employment. This process of erosion of traditional livelihoods, such as fishing, 
has damaged social cohesion, fostering frustration and grievances among community members, 
especially youths, who are recruited by oil companies and equipped with weapons to protect facilities, 
contributing to insecurity risks related to restiveness within the community (Oshienemen et al. 2018). 
Disproportionately facing harmful economic and environmental impacts of oil extraction, local 
communities such as Ijaws and the Ogonis have agitated and protested against the multinational 
oil companies and the federal government (Day and Caus 2020). This can then inform risk of further 
violence through state repression of oil-related protests. Overall risks of insecurity and violence over 
oil in the Niger delta can therefore be attributed to complex interactions between ecological, social 
and institutional factors (Boele et al. 2001), compounded by weak governance, poor implementation 
of environmental protection regulations, as well as exclusion of local communities from resource rents 
and benefits (Kankara 2013; Okpaleke and Abraham-Dukum 2020). Therefore, not only is there a need 
to adopt stricter measures of accountability for environmental degradation, but effective economic 
instruments could also be used to address oil-related insecurity risks and outcomes (Aghalino and 
Eyinla 2017).
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